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Abstract. In this article the author explicates Herbert Hart’s theory of an ascriptive language as it 
has been developed in his influential early paper “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights”. 
In the section ‘Discussion’ the author argues that the theory of ascriptive legal utterances, which 
is grounded on Austin’s and Searle’s theory of a speech act, provides the methodological basis 
for his analytical approach to philosophical and legal issues. In the section ‘Results’ the author 
justifies that an ascriptive is a specific speech (illocutionary) act. In the section ‘Conclusion’ the 
matter concerns the original linguistic formula of an ascriptive that accurately reflects its nature. 
This article elaborates on the interpretation of ascriptive speech acts in legal language by 
evaluating the influence of philosophy of language on the formation of modern legal philosophy, 
along with evaluating the contribution of conceptual development of legal philosophy in the 
speech acts theory. 
Introduction 
Herbert Hart is best known for his fundamental work 
“The Concept of Law” [1], which led to the 
establishment of a new trend in legal theory – analytic 
legal philosophy. This specific movement, originally a 
part of analytic philosophy and then an independent 
branch of scientific knowledge, is characterized by an 
extensive use of innovations and methodologies in 
linguistic analysis of the language applied to the study of 
issues in philosophy of law, in normative and conceptual 
contexts. Explicating legal language using the tools 
gained through philosophical study of ordinary language 
has become one of the primary objectives of analytic 
legal philosophy of the kind done by Hart. Therefore, a 
philosophical explication of the content of legal 
language, taking into account its features that distinguish 
it from an ordinary language, is the main project of 
modern analytical legal philosophy [2]. 
In this essay, we explicate Herbert Hart’s theory of 
an ascriptive language as it was developed in his 
influential early paper “The Ascription of Responsibility 
and Rights” [3]. In the section ‘Discussion’, it is 
necessary to argue that the theory of ascriptive legal 
utterances, which is grounded on Austin’s and Searle’s 
theory of a speech act, provides the methodological basis 
for his analytical approach to philosophical and legal 
issues. In the section ‘Results’, it is supposed that an 
ascriptive is a specific illocutionary act. In the section 
‘Conclusion’, the linguistic formula of an ascriptive that 
accurately reflects its nature will be articulated. 
Discussion 
In his 1955 William James lecture series, which was 
later published under the title “How to Do Things with 
Words”, John L. Austin argued against a positivist 
philosophical claim that utterances always ‘describe’ or 
‘constate’ something and are thus always true or false. 
After mentioning several examples of sentences that are 
not used in this context, and are not truth-evaluable, he 
introduces ‘performative’ sentences as another instance. 
According to Austin, a performative utterance is a 
sentence that neither describes nor affirms a fact, but 
contains a felicity condition that must be fulfilled when 
the performance takes place. According to Austin, a 
performative utterance is a sentence that neither 
describes nor affirms a fact, but contains a felicity 
condition that must be fulfilled when the performance 
takes place. There are five characteristics of a 
performative sentence:  
1) The subject of performative sentence must be in the 
form of a first person pronoun. 
2) The verb must be in the same category with 
performative verbs such as ‘tell,’ ‘say,’ ‘demand,’ 
‘advise,’ ‘ask,’ etc. 
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3) The object of a performative sentence is always a 
second person pronoun. 
4) It must be in the form of affirmative not negative. 
5) It must be in the present tense. 
In the study of the ordinary language, Austin 
concluded that not all true or false statements are 
descriptions. Even in a grammatical form, these 
statements are not meant for reporting direct information 
about facts (e.g., in the case of ethical statements). As a 
result “many philosophical perplexities have arisen 
through a mistake of taking straightforward statements 
of fact as utterances that are either (in interesting non-
grammatical ways) nonsensical or intended as something 
quite different” [4]. 
To resolve these perplexities, Austin distinguishes 
between statements that say and statements that do. He 
calls the former ‘constatives’ (declarative or descriptive) 
and the latter ‘performatives.’ Unlike the constative 
sentences, the performative sentences are neither true nor 
false. A performative is both an action and an utterance. 
The fundamental distinction between performative 
sentences and constative sentences is grounded in their 
different verification conditions. The performatives can 
be verified only in terms of correct or incorrect. A 
constative sentence, instead, is a sentence that affirms 
facts, reports events, and describes situations and 
conditions. It must contain truth-values. Let us consider, 
for example, the sentence ‘It is raining.’ It is true if it is a 
fact in the actual world that it is raining right now. If in 
fact it is not raining now, it is simply possible to say that 
the sentence is false. However, when we take a deeper 
look at the constative, we will find that it also fulfills the 
five criteria for a performative sentence, since the above-
mentioned sentence is constative only in terms of its 
surface structure. In a deep structure, it will become: ‘I 
tell you that it is raining.’ In this form, the constative 
sentence also satisfies all the criteria to be a performative 
sentence. Therefore, in short, we can say, somewhat 
roughly but accurately, that the set of constative 
sentences is also included in the set of performative 
sentences. The principle of maximum ease of articulation 
is reflected in this pattern. The metrical phrase ‘I tell 
you…’ is unnecessary and therefore is omitted. A 
sentence ‘I tell you that it is raining right now’, modified 
and disposed of the phrase ‘I tell you’, appears only in 
the surface structure of ‘it is raining’. 
Austin does not provide a complex definition of an 
illocutionary act, and just claims that to perform a 
locutionary act is to perform an illocutionary act, that is, 
performing an act of speaking in opposition to the 
actions of speaking. Therefore, to determine whether a 
locution performs an illocutionary act, one must 
ascertain whether the locution asks, answers, warns, 
informs, etc. Revealing the grammatical form of explicit 
performative verbs is the means of selecting those verbs 
that explicate the illocutionary force of an utterance or 
show what illocutionary acts are to be done. Austin 
considers two lists as complete: a list of “explicit 
performative verbs” and especially a list of illocutionary 
forces of an utterance. The old distinction, however, 
between primary and explicit performatives ‘will survive 
the sea-change’ from the performative/constative 
distinction to the theory of speech acts quite 
successfully. But what will not survive the transition, 
unless perhaps as a marginal limiting case, and hardly 
surprisingly because it gave trouble from the start, is 
pure performatives. This was essentially based on a 
belief that the dichotomy of performatives and 
constatives must be abandoned in favor of more general 
families of related and overlapping speech acts, which 
only recently have been attempted to be classified. Using 
then the simple test of the first person singular, present 
indicative active form, Austin gets a list of verbs. He 
distinguishes five more general classes and calls them 
classes of utterance, according to their illocutionary 
force, with the following names: verdictives, exercitives, 
commissives, behabitives, and expositives [4]. But 
Austin finds that even then some fresh classification 
altogether is needed, and he is not putting any of this 
forward as minimally definitive. 
Searle’s differentiation of the illocutionary force of a 
statement and the propositional content used by him as 
the basis for classification of speech acts allows him to 
reveal the weaknesses of Austin’s taxonomy and to offer 
an alternative taxonomy [5]. What are the criteria by 
which we can tell, of three actual utterances, that the first 
is a report, the second - a prediction, and the third - a 
promise? Searle answers that in order to develop higher-
order genera, we must first know how the species of 
promising, predicting, reporting, etc. differ one from 
another. He attempts to answer that question by 
discovering that there are several quite different 
principles of distinction, that is, there are different kinds 
of differences that enable us to say that the force of this 
utterance is different from the force of that utterance. 
Searle notices that “the most important weakness of the 
taxonomy is simply this: there is no clear or consistent 
principle or set of principles on the basis of which the 
taxonomy is constructed” [5]. Another source of 
confusion relates to the tendency to mix illocutionary 
verbs with the types of illocutionary acts [5]. Searle 
points out that in the case of two nonsynonymous verbs, 
there is no need to describe them as two different 
illocutionary acts. His diagnosis is that: “[T]here are (at 
least) six related difficulties with Austin’s taxonomy; it 
is in an ascending order of importance: there is a 
persistent confusion between verbs and acts, not all the 
verbs are illocutionary verbs, there is too much overlap 
of the categories, too much heterogeneity within the 
categories, many of the verbs listed in the categories do 
not satisfy the definition given to the category and, most 
important, there is no consistent principle of 
classification” [5] 
Searle wants to maintain a clear distinction between 
illocutionary verbs and illocutionary acts, because 
illocutions are a part of the language as opposed to 
particular languages. But illocutionary verbs are always 
a part of a particular language: French, German, English, 
etc. The clear differentiation of illocutionary verbs and 
illocutionary acts serves as the basis of Searle’s research 
strategy. Searle offers three ‘significant’ dimensions as 
the basis for the classification of speech acts: the 
illocutionary purpose, the direction of fit, and the 
condition of sincerity. This provides the opportunity to 
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prove the existence of the following ‘basic’ illocutionary 
acts instead of illocutionary verbs: representatives; 
directives; commissives; expressives; and declarations. 
Further analysis of translating such semantic 
methodology into legal language is now needed to make 
it possible to establish the relevance and validity of some 
utterances falling under the approach adopted, and to 
make clear the special status of the ascriptives in Hart’s 
legal language [6]. Strawson [7] and Grice [8] present 
the idea that the ‘overt intention’ of the speaker in 
unconventional acts is to elicit some reaction from the 
listener, or to induce the performance of any action by 
the listener. The sentence ‘All rise, Court is now in 
session!’ would be an unconventional act. Although, in 
fact, all acts are conventional, as performed in 
accordance with constitutive rules in Searle’s opinion, 
the utterance of the sentence ‘All rise, Court is now in 
session!’ does not require the listener to know the 
illocutionary force and propositional content of the 
utterance (this is due to what is peculiar to legal 
discourse). Though the intended effect of the speaker’s 
will be realized because an unwillingness to obey the 
speaker can cause some negative legal consequences, for 
example, removal from the courtroom. In general, many 
legal procedures, which are often accompanied by such 
sentences, do not require the recognition of the intention 
or illocutionary force of the utterance, because the legal 
language involves the principle ignorantia juris non 
excusat. Therefore, if the effect is realized (the explicit 
performative verb indicates the realization of the 
intentions, indicates the performing of the act), the 
perlocutionary effect is reached naturally. The sentence 
‘All rise, Court is now in session!’ is a performative 
utterance with the perlocutionary effect that casts doubt 
on Austin’s idea that for many perlocutionary acts there 
is no corresponding performative formula in the first 
person singular. The alternative answer is ‘I command 
you to rise, Court is now in session!’ However in the one 
case (the conventional case), the explicit performative 
form may be the name of the very act that is performed if 
and only if the speaker’s overt intention is effective; but, 
in the other case (the nonconventional case) it cannot be 
the name of this act. Consequently, the utterance ‘All 
rise, Court is now in session!’ is a conventional 
performative act with the perlocutionary effect. This 
thesis well confirms Austin’s idea that one should reject 
the proposed performative/constative distinction, but 
also means that one should refute Austin’s own thesis 
that the explicit performative verb cannot be detected in 
a perlocutionary act.  
We have at least two ambiguities – a switch of the 
perlocutionary effect (or of the addressee), and two ways 
of characterizing the distinction perlocution/illocution. 
How is it possible to consider the removal from the 
courtroom as a perlocutionary effect of the declaration 
(1) ‘All rise, Court is now in session!’? The 
perlocutionary effect of this declaration will be that all 
the people in the court rise, and not that the ones who 
decide not to obey are removed! And of course they 
should understand both the meaning content and the 
force of the utterance in order to comply with the pattern 
of behavior that is prescribed. If they do not understand, 
the communication does not take place (there is no 
uptake). Moreover, the removal of the people from the 
court is more likely to be the result (or the perlocutionary 
effect) of a second order that the judge might issue, 
which will be addressed to the police officer – something 
like (2) ‘Officer, get this sitting man out of the court!’ If 
the officer forces the people to go out solely on the base 
of utterance (1), without (2), then (1) was not really a 
speech act addressed directly to the people of the court, 
but to the officer. This implies that the meaning content 
will be considered to be different from the literal content 
[9]. 
The application of analysis of speech act theory to 
the utterance of some legal sentences shows that the 
uniqueness of legal discourse – that is, such prima facie
descriptive sentences as ‘All rise, Court is now in 
session!’ – cannot be studied without exploiting certain 
analytical tools, and without the need to assume a special 
meaning of the legal concepts and their ontological and 
epistemological characteristics. The most successful 
strategy for explaining these characteristics about the 
legal concepts is Hart’s ascriptive approach [10], 
presented in the article “The Ascription of Responsibility 
and Rights” [3]. 
Speech act analysis was Hart’s starting point for the 
elaboration of his legal antireductionism (he consistently 
held that legal language cannot be reduced to nonlegal 
language and that legal terms are not descriptive) and it 
is commonly noted that since this early approach his 
jurisprudence “moves gradually away from its emphasis 
on speech acts” [11]. Hart’s goal is to further understand 
performative utterances entailed by some ascriptive legal 
concepts: “My main purpose… is to suggest that the 
philosophical analysis of the concept of a human action 
has been inadequate and confusing, at least in part, 
because sentences of the form ‘He did it’ have been 
traditionally regarded as primarily descriptive. Whereas 
their principal function is what many venture to call an 
ascriptive, being quite literally to ascribe responsibility 
for actions, much as the principal function of sentences 
of the form ‘This is his’ is to ascribe rights in property” 
[3]. From Hart’s view two important methodological 
conclusions can be supported. First, the ascription of 
responsibility or rights is performed by saying 
something; action verbs are important especially in the 
descriptive use of present and future tenses. Second, the 
ascriptive use occurs mainly in the past tense, where the 
verb is often both timeless and genuinely referring to the 
past as something distinguished from the present. 
Results 
Searle offers three significant dimensions as the basis of 
the classification of speech acts: illocutionary purpose, 
direction of fit between words and the world, and 
sincerity condition. And these dimensions according to 
an ascriptive justify introducing of the illocutionary act, 
a new speech act – namely, the ascriptive speech act –  
to the taxonomy. 
It would appear that the illocutionary purpose of an 
ascriptive is the obligation to do a specific action in the 
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future or to follow a certain line of conduct. In this 
sense, ascriptives are similar to both Searle’s directives 
and commissives, but only in terms of the illocutionary 
point. Like directives, ascriptives are attempts by the 
speaker to get the listener to do something. They may be 
very modest attempts, as when I invite you to do it or 
suggest that you do it, or they may be very fierce 
attempts as when I insist that you do it. Like 
commissives, ascriptives are those illocutionary acts 
which point is to commit the speaker to some future 
course of action. Saying ‘Guilty’, the judge determines 
not only the new legal position of the listener, but 
indicates that he or she must be responsible for an 
offense or misdeed. 
Since the illocutionary force determines the way how 
the propositional content of an illocution should relate to 
the world, it is possible to single out two areas of 
adaptation: ‘word-to-world fit’ and ‘world-to-word fit’. 
The example of saying ‘Guilty’, discussed above, proves 
that the ascriptives adapt ‘the world to the words’ as in 
Searle’s directives or commissives. Indeed, the use of 
such statements as ‘X is guilty of Y murder’, ‘X and Y
have the contract’, ‘X is obliged to pay taxes’ and so on 
shows that the world adapts to words: after such 
expressions are made, X and Y have a legal status that 
did not exist before. Like Searle’s declarations, the 
performance of the an ascriptive is established by the 
fact of successful performing of the act. 
The interpretation of the third dimension of an 
ascriptive – the conditions of sincerity – is of special 
interest. Revealing the content of this parameter of a 
speech act, Searle notes that in doing any illocutionary 
act with some propositional content, the speaker 
expresses his or her certain attitude towards this 
propositional content. Is it possible to determine 
ascriptives through the condition of sincerity? How 
applicable is this condition to ascriptives? As for 
declarations (or commissives), there is no characteristic 
of sincerity in terms of ascriptives, because it is 
impossible to say that the judge, who had pronounced 
someone guilty, or a referee, who had sent a player off, 
were insincere or simply lied. It is impossible to say: ‘I 
convict you for a crime but I have lied’. Extralinguistic 
conventions, which constitute the basis of legal language 
in addition to the rules of an ordinary language, 
determine the nature and the success of an ascriptive.  
The analysis of taxonomy of illocutionary acts, 
ascriptives have much in common with Searle’s 
declarations. As well as declarations, ascriptives 
presuppose the existence of extralinguistic conventions 
necessary for success of this type of the speech act that 
postulate the special social statuses of speaker and 
listener. But despite this apparent similarity of 
ascriptives and declarations, it should be taken into 
account that the interpretation of ascriptives is possible 
only in the context of legal language specifying their 
linguistic content. In this sense, one might get the idea 
(misinterpretation) that in some cases ascriptives can 
take the form of declarations. For example, the sentence 
‘I declare the XXX Olympic Games open in London’ 
uttered by Queen Elizabeth II should be considered as an 
ascriptive, because there is a speaker and listeners. 
Besides, there are extralinguistic conventions pointing to 
the success of the speech act (the games officially started 
at that point) and to the social status of the speaker (a 
particular status of the subject). Nevertheless, this speech 
act is not an ascriptive but a remarkable example of 
Searle’s declaration because it is done in the context of 
nonlegal language. And the sentence ‘I now pronounce 
you husband and wife’, uttered by the priest during a 
church wedding, when this wedding is not recognized by 
the legal system as equal in legal consequences to the 
civil wedding, will be considered a declaration, but if it 
is uttered by an official, it is an ascriptive.  
Conclusion 
Searle’s symbolic representation allows presenting the 
linguistic formula of an ascriptive that accurately reflects 
its nature:  
As  Ø (L has to do Ac). 
Where As is an ascriptive illocutionary purpose,  is 
the direction of a world-to-words fit, Ø is the absence of 
conditions of sincerity, while the propositional content 
indicates that the listener has to do an action (in the 
broad sense), to fulfill an obligation, to suffer restrictions 
or encumbrances, to bear responsibility, etc. Here L is 
the listener and Ac is the action that has to be done by 
the listener. For example, the sentence ‘I declare war’ 
uttered by the president is the good example of an 
ascriptive, because there is a speaker with an official 
position, a particular group of listeners (the population of 
the country), an ascriptive illocutionary purpose as well 
as the propositional content of the illocution that 
indicates the obligation to do or to follow a certain line 
of conduct; the direction of fit as world-to-words 
(something is changing); and the need for listeners to 
perform some actions or follow a certain line of conduct. 
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